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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In her opening brief, Appellant Charlynda Goggin (hereinafter Appellant 
and/or Charlynda) argued that there was insufficient evidence to support any of 
the verdicts and that judgments of acquittal should have been entered on all four 
counts, or, in the alternative, that the court should have granted a new trial on the 
substantive counts as well as the conspiracy counts. Appellant stands on her 
opening brief for these issues. 
In its cross appeal, the state raises for the first time the issue of whether 
the district court's order granting new trial on the two conspiracy counts should 
be reversed because intent to violate the law is not an element of conspiracy in 
Idaho. Appellant asserts that this issue should not be considered because the 
state did not raise this issue below. In any event, Appellant asserts that the state 
has failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court's ruling, and the 
order granting new trial should be affirmed. 
1 
ISSUE 
The state characterizes the issue in the cross appeal as follows: 
Should the district court's order granting a new trial be reversed because 
intent to violate the law is not an element of conspiracy in Idaho? 
The Appellant rephrases the issue as: 
Has the state failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
granting a motion for new trial on the conspiracy counts? 
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ARGUMENT 
THE STATE HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED 
ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE 
CONSPIRACY COUNTS 
A. Standard of review 
As explained in State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62 (Ct. App. 2005): 
Idaho law permits a new trial if the court misdirected the jury on a 
matter of law. I.C. § 19-2406(5). Idaho Criminal Rule 34 outlines the 
standard that the trial court applies when considering a motion for a 
new trial, directing that "the court ... may grant a new trial to the 
defendant if required in the interest of justice." Whether the 
interests of justice require a new trial is a question that is committed 
to the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be 
disturbed absent a showing of manifest abuse. In this case, the 
new trial motion turned upon the propriety of a jury instruction, a 
matter on which this Court exercises free review. If the instructions 
taken as a whole, and not individually, fairly and adequately present 
the issues, state the applicable law, and do not mislead the jury or 
prejudice a party, then there is no reversible error. 
Id., p. 64 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). 
The familiar test for abuse of discretion is as described in Straub v. Smith, 
145 Idaho 65 (2007): 
Abuse of discretion is determined by a three part test which asks 
whether the district court "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one 
of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion 
and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason." 
Id. p. 71 (internal citations omitted). 
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B. The state failed to preserve its argument 
On appeal, the state argues that the intent to violate the law is not an 
element of conspiracy in Idaho. However, the state did not argue this below. 
Rather, in the State's Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Motion For A 
New Trial (hereinafter State's Memorandum) filed in the district court, the state 
argued that the jury instructions were correct and that it had proven the 
necessary intent. (R. p. 965-966.) 
For example, the state argued: 
From the State's perspective, there was no evidence presented that 
the Defendants' did not know that they were involved in the 
manufacture, distribution and/or possession with intent to deliver, a 
controlled substance, to wit: a synthetic cannabinoids. 
State's Memorandum at p. 4 (emphasis in the original). (R. p. 965.) 
It is now well established that the appellate court will not consider errors 
raised for the first time on appeal unless they constitute fundamental error. State 
V. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224-225, 245 P.3d 961, 976-977 (2010). However, the 
fundamental error exception applies only to a defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights, which of course cannot apply here to the state of Idaho in its cross appeal. 
Accordingly, since the state failed to preserve the issue it now raises in its 
cross appeal, this Court should not consider the newly raised issue and should 
simply affirm the district court's order granting new trial on the conspiracy counts. 
4 
C. The district court did not err in granting the motion for new trial 
While Charlynda asserts that this Court should not even reach the merits 
of the new trial issue, in the event that it does, she asserts that this Court should 
nevertheless affirm the order granting new trial on the conspiracy counts. This is 
because the district court's ruling was correct and in any event certainly did not 
constitute a manifest abuse of discretion. 
As the state describes in its brief, Charlynda was charged under the 
general conspiracy statute as well as under the Uniform Controlled Substances 
Act: 
The state charged Goggin under both the general conspiracy 
statute, I.C. § 18-1701, and the conspiracy provision of the Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act, I.C. § 37-2732(f). (R., p. 490.) Pursuant 
to I.C. § 18-1701, a general criminal conspiracy is defined as 
follows: 
If two (2) or more persons combine or conspire to commit 
any crime or offense prescribed by the laws of the state of 
Idaho, and one (1) or more of such persons does any act to 
effect the object of the combination or conspiracy, each shall 
be punishable upon conviction in the same manner and to 
the same extent as is provided under the laws of the state of 
Idaho for the punishment of the crime or offenses that each 
combined to commit. 
The conspiracy provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act 
similarly provides: 
If two (2) or more persons conspire to commit any offense 
defined in [the Uniform Controlled Substances] act, said 
persons shall be punishable by a fine or imprisonment, or 
both, which may not exceed the maximum punishment 
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the 
object of the conspiracy. 
I.C. § 37 -2732(f). 
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Pursuant to the plain language of these statutes, a person is guilty 
of conspiracy if he or she conspires with another to commit an 
illegal act and at least one of the conspirators does some act in 
furtherance of the illegal objective. 
Respondent's brief at p. 12 (footnote omitted). 
The state is incorrect in its conclusion. The plain language of the statutes 
requires a defendant to enter into an agreement with another to commit a crime 
or offense. The statutes do not provide merely that a defendant agree to commit 
an act which happens to be illegal, rather, the statutes require that the defendant 
enter into an agreement to commit an act which he or she knows is illegal. In 
short, the specific use of the terms offense or crime, rather than act, shows that 
the statute requires the defendant to understand that the act that is being agreed 
upon is actually a crime. 
The state cites to State v. Rolon, 146 Idaho 684 (Ct.App. 2008), a 
conspiracy to traffic case, to try and make its point, but the full relevant passage 
is as follows: 
Negating the specific intent element amounts to fundamental error. 
A general criminal intent requirement is satisfied if it is shown that 
the defendant knowingly performed the proscribed acts, but a 
specific intent requirement refers to the state of mind which in part 
defines the crime and is an element thereof. State v. Fox, 124 
Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181,183 (1993). In other words, specific 
intent requires not only the doing of an act, but the performance of 
that act with the intent to cause the proscribed result. While an 
Idaho court has not explicitly held as much, it is generally accepted 
that conspiracy is a specific intent crime that requires the intent to 
agree or conspire and the intent to commit the offense which is the 
object of the conspiracy. See 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 112 (June 
2008). In contrast, instructions given by the court in this case--
defining both "intent" and "willfu/ly"--described general intent (the 
intent to commit an act, not the intent to commit a crime) which, 
read in concert with the instructions setting out the elements of 
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conspiracy, implied that Rolon needed only to have general, rather 
than specific intent (a higher standard) to be found guilty. 
Id. p. 691 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
In short, while it does not reach our specific question, Rolon nevertheless 
shows that it is the agreement to commit a crime, and not just an agreement to 
perform an act which mayor may not be a crime, which is criminalized by the 
crime of conspiracy. Since a conspiracy conviction does not require that the 
substantive offense actually be committed, it makes perfect sense that a higher 
standard of intent is required to commit the crime. In other words, requiring the 
defendant to actually agree that a crime should be committed, as opposed to 
merely agreeing that an act be performed which just so happens to be a crime, 
prevents the conviction of a person who neither committed a substantive offense 
nor agreed that the law should be broken. 
Requiring the defendant to intend that a crime be committed also makes 
sense when policy reasons are considered. While there is ample reason to 
provide safeguards against convicting persons who did not commit a substantive 
offense nor agreed to commit a crime, there is no valid reason to convict persons 
who did neither. 
The state also cites to United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671,95 S.Ct. 1255 
(1975), but this case does nothing to change our analysis. There, defendants 
who had assaulted undercover narcotics agents were convicted of assaulting 
federal officers and for conspiring to do so. The Supreme Court held that since 
the statute was designed to protect federal officers and to insure a federal forum 
for prosecution of attacks upon federal officers, the statute did not require the 
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assailant be aware that his victim was a federal officer. Thus, in a prosecution for 
conspiracy to assault a federal officer, the government was not required to show 
that the defendant was aware that the intended victim was a federal officer and 
that the assault would violate federal law. 
Of course, in an assault case (and conspiracy to assault), the defendant 
knows that any assault is unlawful and/or that he is agreeing that an unlawful 
assault take place. Thus, the defendant in that case is not agreeing to something 
that he does not know is illegal, the assault is obviously illegal, all that is 
unknown is the proper court that will hear the case and the possible penalty. In 
other words, the federal nature of the officer is only a jurisdictional requirement, 
without it the defendant has still conspired to violate state law. 
Finally, regardless of this Court's ultimate decision on our question, the 
state has still failed to prove that the district court abused its discretion. The test 
is not whether this Court would decide this question of first impression differently 
from the district court. Rather, the test is whether there was a manifest abuse of 
discretion by the district court. 
Here, the district court clearly understood that the decision to grant or 
deny a new trial was within its discretion. (R. p. 1009.) The district court also 
acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards. Since this was an issue of first impression in Idaho, the district court 
analyzed the matter using both Idaho law and the law of other jurisdictions which 
had considered the issue. (R. p. 1011-1015.) The court reached its decision by 
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an exercise of reason, granting the motion for new trial on the counts it believed 
were appropriate (the conspiracy counts) and denying it for the rest. 
Given all of this, the state has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth in her opening brief, Charlynda requests this Court reverse the 
district court's denial of her motion for judgment of acquittal on all counts, or, in 
the alternative, remand this matter for a new trial on all the counts, including the 
delivery counts. 
Further as to the cross appeal, Charlynda requests that this Court affirm 
the district court's order granting the motion for new trial and grant the state no 
relief. 
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